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 Alienated Politics: Labour Insurgency and the 
Paternalistic State in China 
 
Eli Friedman 
Cornell University  
ABSTRACT 
Is there a labour movement in China? This contribution argues 
that China does not have a labour movement, but that 
contestation between workers, state and capital is best 
characterized as a form of ‘alienated politics’. Widespread 
worker resistance is highly effective at the level of the firm be-
cause of its ability to inflict losses on capital and disrupt public 
order. But authoritarian politics in China prevent workers from 
formulating political demands. Despite the spectacular 
repressive capacity of the state, the central government has in 
fact responded to highly localized resistance by passing generally 
pro-labour legislation over the past decade. The consequence of 
this is that worker unrest has produced important political shifts 
at the national level, but these have come about without 
workers’ direct involvement in the process. In other words, 
workers are alienated from the political object that they 
themselves have produced. As a consequence, when the state 
intervenes in labour politics, it appears to be doing so of its own 
accord, i.e. paternalistically. This framework helps us to 
understand how worker unrest in China has become highly 
antagonistic towards employers and the local state, while 
maintaining the stability of the system as a whole. 
INTRODUCTION 
Are labour movements a twentieth century phenomenon, now 
relegated to the status of historical also-ran? As was discussed in the 
2013 Forum issue of Development and Change, there has been a major 
upsurge in global activism since 2010. It was clear in Kees Biekart and 
Alan Fowler’s (2013) Introduction to the Debate section on ‘Activisms 
2010+’, that traditional labour movements — in which formal unions 
mobilize membership in making political and economic demands on 
state and capital — have been notably absent in this upsurge. Given 
increasing inequality, unemployment and precarity of work globally, this 
absence cannot be explained by workers’ satisfaction with their current 
lot. While the social, cultural, economic and political factors that have 
resulted in the seeming terminal decline of twentieth century labour 
institutions are complex, it is beyond doubt that the labour movement in 
the global North is a shadow of its former self. If we were to look for 
signs of an emergent labour movement today, we might reasonably look 
to the world’s most dynamic centre of capital accumulation over the past 
generation — The People’s Republic of China. 
Is there a labour movement in China? One common perspective 
— and the one we are most frequently exposed to in the West — leads 
to quite pessimistic conclusions. Chinese workers are brutally exploited 
as they are subject to long hours, low pay, monotonous work, while 
being denied basic political rights such as freedom of association, the 
right to strike and collective bargaining rights. In recent years, the 
inability of the Chinese working class to act collectively has come to be 
symbolized by the worker suicides at Foxconn (J. Chan and Pun, 2010; 
 Pun and J.W. Chan, 2012). In a situation in which collective voice is not 
possible, high turnover rates and labour shortages have become 
endemic in Chinese industry as workers choose the individualized ‘exit’ 
option. When workers do protest collectively, it almost never extends 
beyond a single workplace; to do otherwise incites harsh state 
repression. 
On the other hand, Beverly Silver and Lu Zhang (2009) have 
referred to China as the ‘epicenter of global labor unrest’, and China 
currently has more strikes than any other country in the world. Despite 
having no right to strike, workers who walk off the job are likely to win 
many of their demands and regularly gain double-digit salary increases. 
Although there are no independent unions or political parties and 
workers view the official All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 
as illegitimate, there have been major policy changes. Minimum wages 
around the country are finally outpacing inflation, social spending has 
increased rapidly for more than a decade, and the central government 
has enacted a raft of new legislation intended to help workers. Which is 
it: are workers hopelessly atomized or is a powerful labour movement 
emerging? As posed in the Introduction to this Debate section, are 
worker struggles merely defensive in nature? And what has been the 
role of the state in responding to increased labour conflict? 
In this contribution I suggest that labour politics in contemporary 
China are best characterized as a form of ‘alienated politics’. Worker 
resistance is rational at the level of the firm (e.g. demands for higher 
wages), but when aggregated at the class level, tens of thousands of 
incidents of protest appear irrational in that they pose no political 
demands (e.g. right to strike, independent unions, social welfare). And 
yet, given the real threat to social stability posed by ongoing cellularized 
worker insurgency, the state must respond to this ‘irrational’ bargaining 
partner. Over the last decade, the central government has enacted a 
series of pro-labour policies and pieces of legislation with the hopes of 
ameliorating class conflict. Thus, worker resistance is political and does 
have major consequences — but it is alienated in the sense that workers 
themselves are not able to participate in politics at the class level. The 
consequence of this is that when the state enacts pro-labour legislation 
unilaterally, and seemingly of its own accord, it appears to be doing so 
paternalistically rather than in response to a specifically articulated 
demand. This helps us to account for the stability of the system even 
while workers have become increasingly antagonistic towards employers 
and local governments. 
This perspective provides greater analytical clarity than is 
possible with the popular ‘corporatist’ framework. More than twenty 
years ago, Anita Chan (1993) inquired as to whether the future of 
Chinese labour politics was ‘revolution or corporatism’. While the 
question as originally posed helped to illuminate important conditions at 
the time, neither of these outcomes has come to pass. Even the more 
specific sub-variety of ‘state corporatism’, in which government-
dominated representative bodies incorporate the working class in a non-
democratic manner, cannot account for contemporary dynamics. 
Expansive worker unrest is testament to the illusory (Ost, 2000) nature 
of Chinese corporatism: even if official unions claim to speak on behalf of 
workers, these representatives have not in any meaningful sense 
 incorporated the working class into legalized and rationalized channels of 
contention. Alienated politics allows us to move beyond an anticipation 
of incorporation to explain current patterns of insurgent resistance at 
the local level as well as elite-level responses. 
Although there is no labour movement in China, workers have 
not been passive. And their resistance — sporadic, ephemeral and 
limited in scope though it may be — has had major political 
consequences. In light of increasing worker unrest for two decades, how 
is it that the state has been able to ‘alienate’ politics and keep the new 
working class so cellularized? Certainly brute force has played a role, but 
repression has developed in more nuanced ways as well. 
 
DEPOLITICIZATION 
As argued by Wang Hui (2006,2009), depoliticization has been a 
key project of the Chinese state. Partially in response to the very real 
trauma that many people experienced during the Cultural Revolution, 
the Party has insisted on pragmatism in the reform era. Politically, this 
has resulted in the state using its symbolic power to de-emphasize class 
categories, in many ways paralleling similar patterns of enhanced 
individualization occurring in the West (Beck, 1992; Yan, 2010). Some 
Chinese scholars have argued that the state and academy have bid 
‘farewell’ to class (Guo, 2009), and that class discourse has been 
‘subsumed’ (Pun and C.K.-C. Chan, 2008).1 
                                            
1 What Pun and Chan believe class discourse has been subsumed by is not clear to me. But the 
Individualization of conflict has not merely proceeded at the 
symbolic level. Rather, the state has taken concrete administrative steps 
to prevent aggrieved workers from linking up. The shift from the social 
contract, which undergirded the system of labour relations in the 
command economy, and its replacement by a legal contract is essential 
in the individualization of conflict (Friedman and Lee, 2010). Similarly, 
Feng Chen (2007) has argued that the state has endowed workers with a 
growing array of individual rights but that such seeming advances are 
undermined by the continual absence of collective rights, namely the 
right to organize and strike. When workers try to file collective 
grievances through the legal system, courts seek to break them up into a 
series of individual cases (F. Chen and Xu, 2012). While not specific to 
labour grievances, the state has developed an advanced set of 
techniques for engaging and defusing potential troublemakers at the 
local level (Lee and Zhang, 2013). 
In addition, the state has continued to coercively enforce the 
ACFTU’s monopoly on working class representation. A deeply 
conservative organization, the official union federation is tightly 
controlled by the state from the central to the local level (F. Chen, 2009), 
and is generally controlled by management within the enterprise. Unions 
remain reactive to strikes, and they are legally required to encourage 
workers to re-establish production as soon as possible in the event of a 
work stoppage. Although the ACFTU has played an important role in 
pushing for legal reform at the national level, it is likely either to side 
                                            
unmistakable implication of their article is that there is a declining relevance of class on the 
discursive level in China. 
 with management or serve as an intermediary in the case of labour 
conflict at the enterprise level (F. Chen, 2010; Friedman, 2012). Unions 
are sometimes amenable to pushing for economic demands within the 
enterprise, but they work in coordination with the state’s repressive 
apparatus to ensure that worker unrest does not extend beyond a single 
workplace. Workers have occasionally demanded democratic elections 
for enterprise-level union representatives, but any attempt to establish 
formally independent organizations will be met with harsh state 
repression. 
Even if these techniques have restricted worker unrest to 
particular workplaces, labour conflicts have nonetheless caused major 
disruptions. In response to this the state has massively expanded its 
repressive capacity (though it should be noted that labour unrest is just 
one of the many sources of instability). Much of the military’s attention 
and resources have been directed towards enhancing ‘non-combat 
operations’— i.e. preparing for domestic rather than foreign threats 
(Fravel, 2011). So-called ‘stability-maintenance’ committees have been 
set up at all levels of the state (X. Chen, 2013), and by 2012 the 
government was spending nearly 5 per cent more on internal security 
than it was on national defence (Buckley, 2012). Additionally, social 
stability has come to be an important criterion in government officials’ 
performance evaluations (Zhu, 2011). 
DEATH OF ONE CLASS — BIRTH OF ANOTHER? 
During the state socialist period, urban workers in state-owned 
enterprises were a privileged class. While they were subject to intensive 
control, the work unit also provided generous welfare benefits known as 
the ‘iron rice bowl’. But beginning in the late 1990s, the government 
encouraged massive layoffs (Solinger, 2001), privatization (Solinger, 
2009), and reductions in benefits in order to make the remaining 
enterprises competitive in the market (Gallagher, 2005). Although the 
former ‘leading class’ suffered immensely in this process, they did not go 
down without a fight, and the late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a 
major upsurge in protest (Hurst, 2009; Lee, 2002). While such protests 
over privatization or theft of pensions among state-sector workers still 
occur occasionally, they have largely subsided in recent years. 
Emerging from an entirely different social universe, a new class 
of migrant workers began to appear in urban China in the 1980s and 
1990s. The emergence of this class has fundamentally altered all aspects 
of social life domestically, while allowing for a major reconfiguration of 
supply chains globally. Now numbering more than 250 million, these 
workers are internal migrants who have left the countryside for the city. 
In doing so, they forsake their right to access social goods such as 
healthcare, education and pensions. In China, the hukou system of 
household registration ties the provision of such services to place, such 
that if you leave your place of registration you are guaranteed nothing 
(K.W. Chan, 2009).2 While there are major differences with 
undocumented immigrants in Western countries, there are important 
parallels in terms of their economic and political pre- carity. Primary 
                                            
2 There is some debate about the continuing relevance of the hukou system, with Shaohua Zhan 
(2011) suggesting it is not so important in determining life chances, while Kam Wing Chan sees 
it as an ongoing obstacle to migrant integration (K.W. Chan, 2010; K.W. Chan and Buckingham, 
2008). 
 grievances that migrants have experienced include low pay, non-
payment of wages, long hours, dangerous working conditions, abusive 
management and non-payment of social insurance. 
Ching Kwan Lee (2007) has produced the definitive account of 
worker protest in reform-era China. Following Beverly Silver, she has 
referred to the defensive protest that attends the unmaking of a class 
(among state- sector workers) as Polanyi-style protest. This is because 
these workers were in a highly protected and decommodified form of 
employment, and were subsequently thrust into a situation in which 
they had to secure livelihood through the market. Lee refers to 
resistance among migrants as Marx-style protest, as it occurs during the 
process of class formation. 
Indeed, a Marxist perspective (broadly speaking) is immensely 
useful in understanding the politics of the particularly raw form of 
capitalist labour relations that emerged in China’s industries in the 
reform era. Migrant worker unrest looks quite similar to the first stage of 
the Communist Manifesto teleology, in which workers are engaged in 
militant struggles against particular capitalists, but have not yet 
articulated a class politics. But Marx’s power of prediction for the China 
case quickly shows its limits, as he argues, ‘The real fruit of their battles 
lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever expanding union of the 
workers’ (Marx, 1994: 166). The various strategies mentioned above 
have thus far prevented anything that looks like an ‘ever expanding 
union’ from emerging. 
Nonetheless, some scholars remain relatively sanguine about the 
development of class politics in China. In particular, Pun Ngai and Chris 
Chan have argued that migrant workers are a class in formation, and that 
they have become more consciously antagonistic to capital (C.K.-C. Chan, 
2010, 2012; C.K.-C. Chan and Pun, 2009). This line of argumentation 
echoes — though not explicitly — theorization associated with 
operaismo, which sees direct confrontation in the workplace and wage 
demands as potentially revolutionary activity. From this perspective, ‘the 
workers become, from the first, “a class for itself’ — that is, from the 
first moments of direct confrontation with the individual employer’ 
(Tronti, 1971), and the fact that such activity is divorced from a grand 
political agenda is not seen as a sign of weakness. Regardless of one’s 
analysis of the situation, there is scholarly unanimity that migrant worker 
resistance in China has remained fractured and ephemeral. Even if 
workers frequently win immediate demands directed at their employers, 
they have not built up sustainable political organization. 
Given limited space, I can only provide a couple of recent 
examples to illustrate these dynamics. For many years, a lawless legal 
environment resulted in a prevalence of rights-based demands among 
Chinese workers. As just one recent example, in August 2013, workers 
from the Xinrongxin Kitchen Appliance Company went on strike to 
demand four months of back wages (totaling RMB 4 million).3 On the 
morning of 27 August, they began a public march with signs demanding 
their back wages. During the ensuing confrontation with the police, the 
twelve-year-old daughter of one of the workers was beaten over the 
head by a police officer. Although the outcome of this case was not 
                                            
3 See: http://nandu.oeeee.com/nis/201308/28/102376.html 
 reported, it is common for workers to receive some, if not all, of their 
owed wages in such cases. If enterprise managers flee — not an 
uncommon occurrence — the local government will often provide some 
compensation to prevent further unrest. 
In recent years interest-based demands have become more 
common in China, a turning point marked symbolically by the 2010 strike 
wave sparked by workers atNanhai Honda (Friedman, 2013; see also 
C.K.-C. Chan, 2014). Two years later, a similar strike occurred at the joint-
venture Youde Auto, an electrical parts supplier in Wuhan.4 Wages at 
Youde were originally RMB 1,100, exactly the minimum wage for Wuhan. 
Upset with such low pay, more than 1,000 workers at the plant went on 
strike demanding a RMB 500 wage hike. As is common in most strikes, 
workers did not trust the management- controlled union to represent 
them, but they were also reluctant to choose their own representatives 
for fear of reprisals. Management’s first two offers were well below 
what workers were demanding. Eventually the strike ended when 
workers agreed to a RMB 200 wage rise — far short of their original 
demand, but still a nearly 20 per cent increase over existing wages. 
Even in the case of regularly occurring strike waves, there is little 
interworkplace coordination, and sustainable political organization does 
not develop. One clear example of this phenomenon comes from the 
sanitation sector in Guangzhou, which has experienced successive strikes 
since 2008 (Friedman, 2014). After the first strike in Baiyun district in 
2008, the official Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions attempted to 
                                            
4     See: http://www.clb.org.hk/en/printmail/node/110118 
establish a sectoral union to raise standards for employees in the 
hundreds of privately-owned sanitation companies that were 
responsible for street sweeping and garbage collection. But this attempt 
by the government-controlled union federation failed, and workers in 
other districts went on strike in 2010 and early 2012 to demand higher 
wages. In late 2012 and early 2013, there was a massive strike wave 
involving thousands of workers in nearly every district of the city. This 
activity was not centrally coordinated, but rather consisted of copycat 
strikes in which workers at various private companies all shared common 
grievances of low wages and long hours. The government eventually 
intervened, promising to devote hundreds of millions of yuan to increase 
salaries for sanitation workers, and to establish strict industry-wide 
standards. However, sustainable and independent inter-workplace 
organization did not result from the strike wave. As workers remain 
isolated from each other, enforcement of new standards remains a 
serious concern. 
There have occasionally been moments in which some space 
opened for civil society participation in worker organizing. One notable 
recent case is the campaign around the imprisonment of Wu Guijun. This 
case began in May 2013, when workers at a factory owned by Diweixin 
went on strike. The factory was shutting down and the workers had been 
in ongoing negotiations over their severance. Approximately two weeks 
into the strike, a number of workers were arrested while protesting — 
among them Wu Guijun, a worker- selected representative. Although the 
other workers were released relatively quickly, Wu was kept in 
detention. In mid-September, the case began to be publicized on Weibo 
 (China’s Twitter-equivalent), with people around the country demanding 
Wu’s release and rallying around the slogan, ‘Striking is not a crime’. 
Despite involvement from civil society organizations in Mainland China, 
Hong Kong and overseas, Wu remains imprisoned. At the time of writing, 
his court date has just been announced, and labour activists will be 
watching the results closely. This is the most explicitly political example 
of labour activism that has occurred within China in recent memory. 
While the outcome — both for Wu personally, and more broadly 
speaking — is still not clear, this represents a significant development. 
While Chinese worker activism has not cohered into an 
organized and politicized force, it has — as already mentioned — caused 
major economic and social disruption. While it is impossible to state with 
any confidence precisely how many strikes and worker protests occur in 
China (such official numbers are a state secret), there are certainly 
thousands if not tens of thousands of such incidents every year.5 
Although the central state has thus far failed to reduce worker 
insurgency, it is not for lack of effort. 
A DOUBLE MOVEMENT IN CHINA? 
In recent years, scholars have written extensively on the Chinese 
state’s ability to maintain authoritarian power despite growing 
differentiation in the economy and society. This durability has been 
attributed to a number of factors — rationalization of decision-making 
                                            
5 Until 2005, the government released statistics for the number of ‘mass incidents’, events in 
which twenty-five or more people engage in some form of public demonstration. Unofficial 
estimates put the total number of mass incidents at 180,000 for 2010. It is unknown what 
percentage is labour-related, but most scholars agree that labour, land and environmental issues 
are the largest sources of unrest. 
processes (Nathan, 2003), reinvention of the ‘revolutionary heritage’ 
(Perry, 2007:7), elite cohesion, and capacity to integrate emergent 
groups (Dickson, 2003; Wright, 2010), among other factors. 
However, it is also evident that the state has been relatively 
responsive in making major material concessions. This was most clearly 
represented by a significant increase in social spending and a raft of pro-
labour legislation enacted under the administration of Hu Jintao (2002-
2012). After decades of unrelenting marketization of health (Reddy, 
2008), education (Mok, 2000; Mok et al., 2009), pensions (Frazier, 2010), 
and housing (Hsing, 2009; Huang, 2013; Logan et al., 2009), the 2000s 
witnessed increased government expenditures in each of these areas. 
Having actively pursued wage repression and labour market deregulation 
for years, the central government enacted a series of laws in 2008 
intended to improve job security and material wellbeing for employees. 
Although fiercely opposed by employers, the landmark Labour Contract 
Law went into effect on 1 January of that year, and imposed new 
restriction on dismissals (among other things). In the wake of the global 
economic crisis, by the end of 2008 it seemed as though the high tide of 
marketization had subsided in China. 
These shifts led Wang Shaoguang to argue that China was 
experiencing the ‘double movement’ just as Karl Polanyi would have 
expected — decommodification and a re-embedding of the economy 
have now become central to the state’s political agenda (S. Wang, 2008). 
Cui Zhiyuan contends that the official rhetoric of ‘market socialism’ is in 
fact being realized in practice, and that the state is maintaining its 
central directing role in the economy (Cui, 2011, 2012). For a brief 
 moment in 2010-12 (before the fall of Bo Xilai), there was open 
discussion of the relative merits of the Guangdong and Chongqing 
models — the former indicating greater economic and political 
liberalization, while the latter implied continued Party dominance but 
with greater emphasis on redistributive economic policies. Even if Bo 
Xilai has ended up in prison, it appears that the redistributive policies he 
enacted will persist, at least in Chongqing if not nationwide. 
If the central state looked as if it was taking a cue from Polanyi 
and acting in the interest of society as a whole, local officials by and large 
maintained their strong alliance with capital. There have been numerous 
accounts of local governments being quite explicit with investors that 
they have no intention of strictly enforcing laws passed by the central 
government. This was a particularly major issue shortly after the passage 
of the Labour Contract Law in 2008, when many employers complained 
that the economic crisis was already hurting their profits. But the 
clearest example of a conscious undermining of the spirit, if not the 
letter, of the law can be seen in the massive increase of ‘dispatch labour’ 
since 2008. Dispatching refers to labour outsourcing in which 
employment and managerial relations are separated. This allows 
enterprises to avoid direct responsibility for their workers, and also 
makes it possible to skirt social insurance and severance payment reg-
ulations. According to the ACFTU, the total number of dispatched 
workers increased from 20 million to 60 million between 2008 and the 
end of 2010 (Jingji Guancha bao, 2011). Local governments often own 
labour dispatch companies directly or indirectly, and therefore have a 
direct interest in allowing this system to persist. Ironically, the Labour 
Contract Law appears to have served as a further catalyst for 
informalization of labour in China (Kuruvilla et al., 2011). 
In a few instances, it has been the provincial rather than central 
government that has promoted legal reform. Following a failed attempt 
three years earlier, Guangdong province issued a draft version of a law 
to regulate collective negotiations. However, the law was clearly 
intended to constrain worker activism to the legal terrain and was 
roundly condemned by academics and labour NGOs alike. Among other 
problems, the law would for the first time explicitly ban work stoppages 
while negotiations are underway. Critics saw this as an attempt to 
provide a legal basis for cracking down on strikers, and argued that the 
current legal ambiguity of striking was preferable. It is also worth noting 
that during the period of public comment, there was no democratic 
mechanism for expressing the collective interests of workers — again, 
the state’s activity was a response to labour unrest, but it was 
simultaneously indifferent to workers’ opinions of this particular 
response. The consequence is that sympathetic but wholly 
unaccountable scholars and NGO officers were left to speak on behalf of 
workers. At the time of writing, this law remains in limbo. 
Migrant workers were never mobilized during the passage of the 
Labour Contract Law and other labour laws. While awareness of legal 
rights appears to have improved in recent years and workers are likely to 
welcome the new rights they have gained, enforcement remains a major 
problem. It is likely that some kind of independent worker organization 
would be useful in ensuring legal compliance, as has been the case in 
other national contexts (Fine and Gordon, 2010). Workers are by and 
 large left to seek legal enforcement as individuals, and adjudication is 
left up to a generally hostile local state. Thus, despite the emergence of a 
seemingly strong set of legal protections, Chinese workers and 
dominated classes more broadly are increasingly marked by anger and 
anxiety (Zheng, 2012). How can we come to terms with these seemingly 
contradictory trends? 
 
ALIENATED POLITICS 
My central claim is that migrant worker unrest is best 
characterized as a form of ‘alienated politics’. It is worth emphasizing 
that I am not using ‘alienation’ in a humanistic sense and it does not 
refer to any sort of psychological condition among workers. Rather, 
alienated politics describes a situation in which countless cellular and 
depoliticized economic struggles result in major political shifts at the 
national level, while workers are unable to actively determine the form 
and content of this politics. The central state’s efforts at depoliticization 
separates cause (worker unrest) from effect (new legislation), resulting 
in alienation between worker subjectivity and the class-level political 
object that workers themselves have produced.6 The state takes the 
threat of ungovernability (Piven and Cloward, 1977; Silver and Zhang, 
2009) posed by expansive worker unrest quite seriously and has 
therefore responded by seeking to improve material conditions. Yet 
because of the structure of political space in China, most importantly the 
                                            
6 I do not mean to suggest that localized resistance is somehow apolitical (or pre-political in 
Hobsbawm’s [1959] terms). Rather, I am referring to alienation between worker subjects and the 
specific object of class-level politics. 
absence of worker representative organizations, such state activity is not 
a response to specifically articulated demands from below. 
Rather, the consequence of alienated politics is that the central 
state appears to be, and in reality is, attempting to improve material 
conditions
 
for workers of its own accord — i.e. paternalistically.7 The dirty work of 
capitalist growth is left to a despotic local government. As a result, the 
lawlessness and brutal exploitation that have been key features of the 
Chinese development model are enforced by the local state. It is the 
local, and not the central, government that calls in police to break a 
strike; that allows enterprises to illegally employ dispatch or forced 
student labour; and that will order unions to side with management 
during a labour conflict. When higher levels of the state actively 
intervene in labour disputes (more likely to happen in large-scale strikes 
in economically important sectors), they typically do not side completely 
with capital, but rather will seek to enforce compromise. This division of 
labour between different levels of the state allows for explosive growth 
and continued legitimacy of the centre in the midst of a depoliticized and 
fractured but expansive worker insurgency. 
This political economy — referred to as ‘decentralized legal 
                                            
7   For a similar argument in the Latin American context, see Cohen (1982). 
 authoritarianism’ by Ching Kwan Lee (2007) — produces a particular kind 
of proletarian politics. As is true for the protesting farmers in Kevin 
O’Brien and Lianjiang Li’s studies (2006), Chinese workers by and large 
proclaim fidelity to the law and to the central government. But from the 
state’s perspective, worker unrest looks different depending on the 
vantage point (see Table 1). At the local level, it appears as rational-
disruptive. Rational in the sense that worker demands are economic and 
straightforward: the most common demands are related to wages; and 
disruptive in that strikes, road blockages, riots and other forms of 
resistance threaten social and economic stability at the local level. From 
the perspective of the centre, on the other hand, the working class 
appears as irrational-vulnerable. They are irrational in the sense that 
they have posed no political demands at the class level that the centre 
can respond to. The state is not deciding how to negotiate with a labour 
movement that is imposing a set of demands, but rather must figure out 
how to respond to a demand-less insurgency. The centre must be 
concerned with the stability of the system as a whole rather than the 
profitability of any particular firm. More recently, it has been concerned 
with increasing domestic consumption, and is therefore willing to form 
an indirect alliance with workers — as long as politics remains the strict 
domain of the Party. As a result, the central state views workers as a 
vulnerable group (ruoshi qunti in the official lexicon) and in need of 
succour.  
The consequence of the Chinese state’s dedication to political 
exclusion of the working class, as well as its capacity to enforce this, is 
that China has had a very different experience with labour politics than 
was the case in earlier industrializers. In essence, the Chinese working 
class has won major legislative victories without demanding anything. 
The consequence of this is that they have no sense of ownership of these 
victories, and enforcement remains tenuous. The central state hopes 
that labour relations can be determined by administrative fiat, without 
the emergence of independent organization. The irony is that 
depoliticization has precluded the emergence of a labour movement 
while simultaneously undermining the capacity of the state to reduce 
worker insurgency. 
Even though the state has been able to contain unrest to the 
local level, there are still important political implications for the centre. 
Although the coercive measures necessary to stamp out worker 
organization are deployed at the local level, there is almost complete 
consensus throughout the state on this point. Indeed, it is the centre 
that maintains the categorical ban on independent worker organization, 
fearing it could threaten the stability of the system as a whole. There are 
many risks to the central government in pursuing this strategy. The first 
issue is already a reality: the huge increase in domestic repressive 
capacity (mentioned above), which is a significant economic burden. 
Although China is hardly democratic at present, it is possible to imagine a 
further deepening of repression, including stepped-up police violence 
and activist imprisonment. Second, and somewhat more speculatively, 
political exclusion of the working class from national politics can have 
the unintended consequence of politicizing worker demands (Seid- man, 
1994). While there is scant evidence that this is happening in China at 
present, it is possible to imagine the development of citizenship-based 
 demands, particularly from migrant workers. If such a movement were 
to occur in the current institutional vacuum, it could spell trouble for the 
central state. Finally, I have argued that alienated politics has allowed for 
the central state to intervene in labour strife strategically (either 
legislatively or in the resolution of particular conflicts) in a way that 
bolsters their legitimacy. It is an open question as to whether protesting 
workers actually believe in the benevolence of the centre, or if public 
displays of fidelity are merely strategic — and for the moment, the 
distinction is not that important since they are acting within the 
hegemonic framework. But the situation is dynamic, and there are 
scenarios in which worker discontent could scale up in a way that could 
be directly antagonistic to the central state. This would be more likely if 
migrant worker protest moves in a more Polanyian direction of 
demanding better access to social services such as education, 
healthcare, pensions and housing. Since migrants in all major cities face 
similar forms of exclusion, this kind of protest could quickly implicate 
higher levels of the state. In short, if worker unrest expanded beyond the 
factory to demands over reproduction, this would involve the stitching 
together of a broader constituency, thereby testing the limits of the 
central state’s paternalism. 
CONCLUSION 
Is there a labour movement in China? My answer thus far has 
been no, but that does not mean that there are no labour politics. 
Worker unrest at the local level looks very Marxian in that workers are 
directly antagonistic to enterprise management in demanding higher 
wages, and they frequently come into direct conflict with the police and 
local state. Migrant workers are increasingly confident and willing to use 
radical tactics to attain their ends. But such activism has not resulted in 
an ‘ever expanding union of the workers’ as the Chinese state has 
proven astonishingly adept at depoliticiz- ing and cellularizing conflict. 
When we look at the central state, on the other hand, the situation looks 
much more Polanyian. Rather than unmediated antagonism, the central 
government has been moving towards class compromise in the 
economic sphere. ‘Alienated politics’ helps us to explain the gap 
between fierce antagonism at the local level and movements towards 
compromise and collaboration at the centre. 
Thus far, the central state has been able ride out successive 
waves of insurgency, while ensuring continually high rates of growth. 
There are signs, however, that the strategy of depoliticization is reaching 
a limit. The government has been trying for a decade to ‘rebalance’ the 
economy, an effort that received increased attention after the economic 
crisis of 2008. Rebalancing implies, among other things, reducing intra- 
and inter-regional inequality and increasing domestic consumption. 
There is broad agreement at the central level that getting people to 
spend more will require expanding social spending on health, education, 
pensions and housing (Chamon and Prasad, 2010), as well as allowing 
more rural migrants to settle permanently in the cities. But in the ten 
years since the central state began calling for readjustments, inequality 
has only grown and domestic consumption has remained flat.8 While 
there are a number of factors that have produced this outcome, a key 
                                            
8 At the time of writing, consumption remains flat even as the country has maintained relatively 
strong overall growth. See: http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/10/18/chinas-growth- 
quickens-but-what-about-consumption/ 
 element is the difficultyof enforcing class compromise in the absence of 
class organization. Rebalancing the economy requires overcoming forces 
in society that are tied to the current model of growth, and this cannot 
be accomplished through purely technocratic (depoliticized) means. A 
labour movement that has mobilized its rank and file in fighting for and 
winning new rights will likely have an interest and some capacity in 
fighting for the enforcement of those rights. In contemporary China, on 
the other hand, new rights are granted by the paternalistic state in a 
political environment in which local governments remain largely 
committed to the interests of employers. If the history of the twentieth 
century is any guide (which admittedly might not be the case), a more 
inclusive politics will be necessary to realize a more inclusive economy. 
If alienated politics complicates the process of economic 
rebalancing, what then might occur in the event of a slowdown? While 
predicting political developments in China is a notoriously risky 
endeavour, the first possibility is simply that worker unrest declines. If 
labour-intensive manufacturing relocates either domestically or 
internationally, this would undercut workers’ bargaining power. Indeed, 
there is already evidence that defensive struggles are on the rise in the 
Pearl River Delta as higher costs have pushed capital to move 
elsewhere.9 The state would likely be able to ride out an increase in 
defensive struggles, but would then be faced with the question of what 
to do with millions of unemployed migrants. Economic and political 
elites would lock in their advantages, and a transition to a higher value-
                                            
9 For a non-representative sample, see the media reports collected here: http://www. 
numble.com/PHP/mysql/clbmape.html 
added economy would be frustrated. 
Another possibility is that a slowdown would give increased 
impetus for the state to make efforts at building a more substantive 
corporatist arrangement. Although this would entail political risks for the 
centre, as it would demand some delegation of authority to non-state 
actors, it would likely help redirect a greater share of wealth to 
employees, thereby helping to encourage the transition to a 
consumption-based economy. A slowdown in growth could increase the 
centre’s urgency in bringing about such a transformation in the structure 
of the economy. 
A final possibility is that slackening growth leads to increased 
worker unrest that is able to overcome state repression (in its various 
guises) to build durable organized networks of resistance. This would 
require reaching some ‘tipping point’ in which a large enough volume of 
people would have to be affected simultaneously. This seems quite 
unlikely at present. However, it is worth considering how new patterns 
of migration and land reform in the countryside may impact these 
dynamics. In previous years, collective rural land has acted as a safety 
valve to defuse labour struggles among migrant workers in the city. 
Recently, more migrants have expressed a desire to stay in the city. 
Additionally, with ongoing land expropriation and more experiments 
with commodification of rural land, it is likely that an increasing share of 
migrant workers will not have any land to return to. By diminishing the 
viability of this safety valve, the state may inadvertently increase the 
intensity of urban labour struggles during an economic downturn. 
If the labour movement is in fact ‘historically superseded’ 
 (Castells, 1997: 360), China provides clear evidence that worker 
resistance is alive and well. But Castells may still be correct: there is no 
labour movement in China, but rather a dispersed and ephemeral 
insurgency. Moreover, evidence is emerging that some of these political 
dynamics may not be limited to China. Vietnam has many close parallels, 
where the state has maintained a categorical ban on independent 
worker organization, while managing to politically contain frequent and 
highly militant wildcat strikes in export processing zones (A. Chan, 2011). 
Even in democratic South Africa, Shauna Mottiar has described service 
delivery protests as, ‘popping up and bursting onto the scene only to 
rapidly subside’, and argues that, ‘Local service delivery demands have 
won limited concessions and tend to consolidate support for the ANC 
rather than igniting a movement against ANC neoliberal policy’ (Mottiar, 
2013: 607). The concept of alienated politics helps to highlight both that 
localized and seemingly apolitical protest can have major consequences 
in the aggregate, but also that the separation of cause from effect can 
bolster the legitimacy of the centre. A labour movement must have the 
capacity to formulate, secure and enforce political demands. The 
Chinese state has thus far been able to prevent such a force from 
emerging, and will likely continue to do everything in its capacity to 
maintain the status quo. But negotiating over rationally articulated 
demands from an organized opponent may eventually seem preferable 
to grasping at the shadow of generalized insurgency. 
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